具身心智的物理主义困境

The Physicalistic Predicament of the Embodied Mind

具身的认知观认为,人类的心智和理性是具身的。从维果茨基活动理论传统的视角出发,通过对莱考夫和约翰逊的"典型例子"以及西伦和史密斯的动力认知案例的分析,对认知语言学中发展起来的两种具身认知主张进行了批判。论证了具身的认知观并没有能够推翻"认知是一个在认识上独立存在的客观属性的过程"这样一种物理主义观点,并进一步揭示了具身的认知观所面临的物理主义困境。

The embodied view of cognition argues that our mind and reason are embodied.This article critically comments on two arguments in support of the embodied view of mind and cognitions as presented in the cognitive linguistics from the view of activity theory traditions,by Lakoff's cases of reasoning from 'typical examples' and Thelen and Smith's example of dynamic cognition;and argue that the embodied cognition didn't undermine a physicalism perspective on cognition as a process of knowing the objective properties of an independently existing reality.