摘要
本文以2000~2008年曾发生过年报重述的我国代表性垄断行业上市公司作为研究对象,考察了高管以年报重述为路径,通过影响企业财务业绩来提高薪酬的可能性。研究发现:高管控制与高管薪酬显著"正相关"。虽然更正报告及补充更正报告与高管薪酬"负相关",但是在高管控制下,垄断企业高管仍然可以通过补充年报重述路径影响其薪酬。
On the base of the theories on the power of the executive proposed by western scholars,this paper proposed further theory on the executive control,Combined with the characteristics of the monopolies in China.The results of the study showed that the executive control held 'positive' correlation with executive compensation.Due to characteristics of the executives of state-owned monopolies who governed both political and economic affairs,it revealed that the executives preferred to control the supplementary of financial restatement to affect their own compensation.This paper provided a new perspective and evidence for the studies on corporate governance and executive compensation of the monopolies in our country.
出处
《上海经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第6期59-72,共14页
Shanghai Journal of Economics
基金
国家哲学社会科学基金项目"规范垄断行业企业高管薪酬问题研究"(项目批准号09BJY031)阶段性研究成果
关键词
高管控制
高管薪酬
年报重述
executive control
executive compensation
financial restatement