我国高等教育的信号传递与信息甄别的混同化特征

On the Pooling of Signaling and Screening in China's Higher Education

信息不对称理论指出,在不同的制度条件下,由于信息产生的成本不同会导致高等教育信号的分离均衡与混同均衡。我国教育体制与社会评价机制的单一化与行政化是混同的教育信号与信息甄别的混同合同相结合的典型表现。而市场的信息甄别机制会进行新一轮的信号筛选,进而产生新的信号值。

According to information asymmetries theory,conditions in different systems,different costs of information generated will lead to higher education signal separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium.China＇s education system and social evaluation of a single mechanism is the typical expression of integration of the educational signaling and screening.Information on the market screening mechanism will signal a new round of screening,thereby creating a new signal value.