不对称雇主学习、外部选择与雇员谈判力

Asymmetric Employer Learning,Outside Option and the Employee's Bargaining Power

本文在非合作博弈(策略式)单边不对称信息讨价还价框架下,按照外部约束(而不是威胁点)的思路来模型化外部雇主的竞争,以分析不对称雇主学习的程度对处于信息劣势的通用性雇员谈判力的决定作用。本文提出的框架弥补了已有文献的一些不足,同时为不对称雇主学习这一劳动经济学概念提供了一个讨价还价理论基础。

In the framework of non-corporative one-sided asymmetric information bargaining,without any outside employer,the general employee＇s bargaining power on firm＇s rents will be affected by how the information is distributed between him and the employer.When the employee has not the information of rents＇ size as the employer does,his situation will be strictly inferior to the outcome when the information is symmetric.However,if the degree of asymmetric employer learning is considered as an outside constraint,when the interval of offers converges to zero,it will completely determine the general employee＇s bargaining power,and the information disadvantage of employee becomes insignificant.