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行政垄断的形成机制及改革思路研究 被引量:1

Research on The Formation and Reformation of Administrative Monopoly
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摘要 对于存在市场失灵的行业,政府对竞争进行限制和排斥;但如果价格规制没有达到效果,则可认为政府规制实际造成了一种不合意的行政垄断的后果。行政垄断的博弈各方都是追求自身利益最大化的行为主体,尤其是政府追求其自身利益导致了行政垄断的产生;行政垄断程度大小受很多因素影响,大致可分为需求因素和供给因素两类。这些因素不但决定了行政垄断程度,而且决定了政企之间的利益分配。电信业改革启示我们,中央政府下一步可以从市场结构、规制改革、反垄断法三个方面破除行政垄断;要彻底根除行政垄断,政治体制改革不可避免。 For the industries where there exists market failure,there is need for the government to regulate the function of competition.However,if the government regulation does not reach the expected goal,this regulation actually becomes a kind of unreasonable administrative monopoly,which does great harm to economics and hasn't been well reformed.So what on earth leads to the emergence and continuance of administrative monopoly? All parties especially the government in pursuit of their own interest give birth to administrative monopoly.The extent of administrative monopoly is determined by many factors,which is composed of two categories: the supply and the demand.Those factors not only determine the extent of administrative monopoly,but also the interest distribution of all parties.Although the administrative monopoly itself is an equilibrium,we can still get some experience from the reformation of telegram industry.The central government can eliminate administrative from the following three aspects: market structure,regulation reformation and the antitrust law.What's more,the political reformation is unavoidable to eliminate administrative monopoly completely.
作者 丁启军
出处 《产经评论》 2011年第3期119-132,共14页 Industrial Economic Review
基金 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"转轨经济中的反行政垄断与促进竞争政策研究"的阶段性成果 项目编号:06JZD0015 负责人:于良春
关键词 行政垄断 价格规制 形成机制 子博弈精炼纳什均衡 administrative monopoly price regulation formation mechanism subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
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参考文献8

  • 1丁启军,王会宗.规制效率、反垄断法与行政垄断行业改革[J].财贸研究,2009,20(4):1-8. 被引量:5
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二级参考文献9

  • 1杨兰品.行政垄断问题研究述评[J].经济评论,2005(6):114-119. 被引量:17
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  • 3于良春.反行政垄断与竞争政策的若干思考[A].于良春.反行政垄断与促进竞争政策前沿问题研究[C].北京:经济科学出版社,2008.
  • 4丁启军.自然垄断行业行政垄断微观效率损失研究[A].于良春.反行政垄断与促进竞争政策前沿问题研究[C].北京:经济科学出版社,2008.
  • 5于立,吴绪亮.2008.《反垄断法》不是解决行政垄断和行业垄断的良策[M]//于良春.反行政垄断与促进竞争政策前沿问题研究.北京:经济科学出版社:125-132.
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  • 8丁启军,伊淑彪.中国行政垄断行业效率损失研究[J].山西财经大学学报,2008,30(12):42-47. 被引量:36
  • 9金玉国.行业所有制垄断与行业劳动力价格[J].山西财经大学学报,2001,23(3):11-14. 被引量:12

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