激励性监管下的电力市场需求侧分时电价机制研究

Study on Time-of-use Price Mechanism in Demand Side of Electricity Market under Incentive Regulation

当前中国电力市场体制下,供电公司需要制定需求侧分时电价以提高电网效率,而政府对销售电价体系制定承担着监管责任。从Ram sey-Boiteux定价的基本思路出发,将不同时段的电力供给看作具有相互替代性的不同服务,考虑电力负荷和分时电价的特殊性,建立基于社会福利最大化的需求侧分时电价模型。模型将峰时段可能造成的阻塞成本上涨或新增电网投资作为外部性因素,引入超弹性概念修正各时段负荷需求价格弹性,并增加带权重的Ram sey指数保障社会福利分配的相对公平,为政府确定分时电价水平以激励性监管供电公司的需求侧分时电价提供了理论参考。

Under the current system of electricity market,power company needs to formulate time-of-use（TOU） price to improve the efficiency of the grid,but the government bears the responsibility for the regulation of the TOU pricing.Based on the basic idea of the Ramsey-Boiteux pricing mechanism and considered the characteristics of power load with TOU price,regarding the power supply of different times as different service which can substitute each other,the TOU pricing model is established based on the maximization of social welfare.The model takes the increased congestion costs of peak load and the additional network investments as external factors,uses the concept of super-elastic price instead of price elasticity,and increases the weight of the Ramsey index to protect the fair distribution of social welfare relatively,which provides a reference for government to regulate the TOU price.