混合绩效评估下的区位——价格竞争研究

Location-Price Competition under Mixed Performance Evaluation

本文以具有平方交通成本的Hotelling模型为基础,探讨了存在混合绩效评估时两企业两阶段区位—价格竞争问题。混合绩效评估的含义是,每个企业的"实际收益"不但依赖于自己的利润,还依赖于它与对手企业的利润之差,而实际收益对利润之差的敏感度代表了相对绩效评估权重。分析表明,对应于不同的相对绩效评估权重,本文模型可以产生包括"最小化差异原理"、"最大化差异原理"等在内的各种均衡结果。作为一个应用,本文模型也可以为理解困扰中国经济发展的重复建设现象提供一些新的洞见。

We construct a simple two-stage model of location-price competition with mixed performance evaluation in which each firm＇ s de facto benefit increases in its own profit but decreases in its opponent＇ s. Depending on relative-performance evaluation weight, our model yields many interesting theoretical results obtained in the existing literature, including the principles of minimum （ maximum ） differentiation. Our analysis can also shed light on the pervasive and prolonged phenomena of duplicative investment in China.