集团控制与国有企业治理

Business Group Affiliation and the Governance of State-Owned Enterprises

本文研究集团控制对国有企业可能产生的正面影响机制——减轻管理层代理问题和可能产生的负面影响机制——加重股东间代理问题,全面评估国有企业集团控制作为国企治理模式改革的有效性。以2004年至2008年中国国有上市公司为样本的统计结果显示:(1)集团控制会有效减轻国有企业的管理层代理问题;(2)当外部监管程度高时,集团控制不会加剧国有企业的股东间代理问题;而当外部监管程度低时,集团控制会加剧国有企业的股东间代理问题。因此,集团控制是一种有效改善国有企业管理层代理问题的治理模式,而由此加剧的股东间代理问题应通过强化外部监管加以解决。

In this study, we investigate the relationship between business group affiliation and two types of agency problem in the state-owned enterprises in China to show the effectiveness of group control as a measure of SOE reform. Drawing on a sample of listed SOEs in the period of 2004--2008, we find that （ 1 ） business group affiliation is useful in mitigating the traditional principal--agent conflicts within SOEs; （2） If the external monitoring mechanism is strong and effective, the business group affiliation would not aggravate so called principal--principal conflicts among shareholders in the SOEs; however, if such mechanism is weak, group affiliation does aggravate such principal--principal conflicts in SOEs. Our results suggest that the business group affiliation is a kind of effective governance structure to mitigate agency problem between managers and shareholders in SOEs while its side effect in aggravating principal-principal conflicts can be controlled by the external monitor from legal system. This study contributes to the business group literature and corporate governance literature; it also carries implications for the SOE reform practices.