FDI与环境规制:基于地方分权视角的实证研究

Empirical Study of the Relationship between FDI and Environmental Regulation:An Intergovernmental Competition Perspective

基于地方分权的视角,本文以环境规制不可直接观测与地方环境决策的策略性博弈为出发点,分别从理论与实证的角度分析是否存在国内地方政府为保持本地的相对优势而采用竞相降低环境标准的方式吸引外商直接投资(FDI)的事实。与已有文献不同,本文通过联合检验地方环境决策竞争效应与环境规制强度对FDI作用方向来判别"逐底竞赛"(race-to-the-bottom)的存在。基于2003—2008年中国277个地级城市构成的面板数据,本文建立空间计量模型对理论命题进行实证检验,结果表明:国内地方政府为吸引FDI而导致的环境政策博弈显著存在,但环境规制对FDI的影响作用平均而言并不显著。分位点估计进一步显示:地方环境决策的竞争程度随分位点的上升而不断增强;环境规制对FDI的作用方向与FDI本身的水平高低密切相关;在FDI低水平的城市间,环境规制对外资并非只是简单的遏止作用;环境"逐底效应"在FDI水平最高的城市间明显弱化,而这一效应在FDI中高水平的城市间最为显著。

This paper is concerned with testing the hypothesized fact whether Chinese municipal governments have the incentives to strategically reduce their environmental stringency in receiving foreign capitals. We present a new empirical framework that accounts for both unobservability of environmental stringency and strategic interaction among local government. The instrumental variable quantile regression method is employed to estimate the model using the panel data consisting of 277 municipalities in China from 2003 to 2008. Our analysis suggests that local governments do incorporate the environmental policy in neighboring municipalities into their own decision calculus in competition for FDI. This effect is stronger for municipalities with higher level of FDI than with lower FDI. The deterrent effect of environmental stringency upon FDI inflow is significant only when the municipality receives FDI from moderate to high level, implying that the ＂race to the bottom＂ may be absent in the regions with low or highest level of FDI.