多任务委托代理模型下排污企业污染治理研究

Study on Pollution Regulation′Incentive Issues by Multitask Principal-agent Model

如何应对经济高速增长所带来的环境压力一直是社会的焦点问题。本文假设排污企业有两个基本的任务维度:经济效益与污染治理。通过构建多任务委托代理模型研究排污企业的最优激励合同,探讨了对排污企业经济利益任务与污染治理任务的激励优化问题。本文发现在排污企业发展的起步时期,应该相对强化对其经济任务的激励强度;企业发展到一定阶段后则应强化对其污染治理的激励强度;同时,两任务的激励成本函数相互依存性的不同,其激励合同也是有区别的。

It has been a social focus issue that how to deal with the environment pressure from the high economy growth rate.Economy benefits and pollution control are two major tasks of the sewage and waste emission enterprises.Based on this notion,this paper carries out a study of the optimal incentive contract of those sewage and waste emission enterprises by using multitask principal-agent model.This paper finds that at the starting development period of sewage and waste emission enterprises,the task should be relatively strengthened on economic incentives;while the enterprises develop to a certain stage,its incentive intensity of pollution control should be enhanced.Meanwhile,because of the difference of interdependence of two incentive task′s incentive cost function,incentive contract is distinguishing.