演化博弈模型在诚信问题中的应用——以注册会计师为例

The Application of Evolutionary Game Model in Good Faith Problems——With CPA as an Example

在有限理性的经济人为假设前提,分别构造注册会计师群体内部及注册会计师和企业管理层之间的博弈模型,分析各个参数对演化稳定策略的影响.研究结果表明:注册会计师的诚信问题,具有必然性和偶然性,必然性因素决定着其行为选择的稳定状态.解决注册会计师诚信问题,需要加强制度约束,提高外部有效监管水平和能力,营造诚信的社会经济环境等.

Based on the assumptions of limited rational economic human,the writer constructs the game model within the CPA group,as well as between CPA and corporate management,and then analyzes the process in which every parameter impact on the evolutionary strategic stability（ESS）.The Conclusion is that CPA＇s good faith problems include inevitability and occasionality,and the inevitable factors in the final determine the steady state of their choice.To solve the CPA＇s good faith problems needs to strengthen the system bound,raise the external effective supervision level and ability and create a good-faith social economic environment.