救助投机、挤入效应与国有企业预算约束硬化

Gamble for Bailout,Crowding-in Effect,and Hardening Budget Constraints of SOE

国有银行的"救助投机"行为促进了国有企业的"预算软约束"和不良贷款的积累。在政府、银行与国有企业之间的长期动态博弈中,由于预算硬约束企业的出现给国有银行提供了改善贷款资产组合的机会,提高了银行在与政府的救助投机博弈中的议价能力,要求政府给予更多的流动性注入,这会产生银行贷款资产中预算硬约束企业贷款占比不断增加的挤入效应。这种挤入效应累积到一定程度,政府的救助将变得非社会最优的,进而政府将停止救助,国有企业的预算约束也随之硬化。

The behavior of gamble for bailout of state owned bank promotes the soft budget constraints of SOE and the accumulation of non-performance loan.In the long dynamic game among government,bank and SOE,because the emerging of hard budget constraints firm to provide state owned bank the opportunity to improve its loan portfolio,it can get more bargaining power in the game for bailout with government,and this will produce the crowding-in effect which makes the share of loan of hard budget constraints firm in bank＇s loan portfolio to increase gradually.When the crowding-in effect accumulates to a critical level,the budget constraints of SOE will be hardened once government stop bailing because of its bailout being socially non-optimal.