不同所有制及领导模式下主导厂商兼并行为研究——对我国煤炭业兼并重组方案的评价与启示

The Merging Behavior of the Dominant Firm under Different Ownership Structures and Leadership Modes:Implications for Coal Resources Rearrangement Projects in China

本文构建了具有成本差异的主导-跟随厂商兼并模型,分别考察了不同所有制及领导模式下,我国煤炭行业主导厂商兼并的动机与能力。研究结果表明,在价格领导模式下,私有的主导厂商有动机且有能力对行业中的全部跟随企业进行兼并,但兼并有损于社会福利;在产量领导模式下,行业整合能改进社会福利,但只有国有主导厂商可能对跟随企业完全兼并,主导厂商与跟随厂商之间的成本差异是影响其兼并能力的关键因素。基于模型分析结果,认为我国现行的煤炭业重组方案是在既定市场结构和产权结构下行业进化的必然选择。

This study builds a dominant- follower model with different costs to explore the merging behaviors of public and private firms of coal industry in China. The results show that, the private dominant firm will and can merge all followers under pricing leadership ; but from view of social welfare, the merging is harmful. Under output leadership, the merging can improve welfare; but only public dominant firm maybe merge all followers and the feasibility is affected by cost difference between dom- inant and follower firms. Based on the results of these analyses, with current leadership modes and ownership structures, we believe that coal resources rearrangement projects in our country are inevitable choices of industrial revolution.