大股东资金占用、业绩困境与盈余管理

Controlling Shareholder Expropriation, Performance Dilemma and Earnings Management

文章手工搜集了中国资本市场上市公司2002年-2006年大股东资金占用的财务数据,实证研究了上市公司"大股东资金占用(掏空)→业绩困境→利用财务报表的盈余管理加以掩饰"的行为模式。研究发现:对于陷入经营困境的亏损公司而言,大股东资金占用越严重,上市公司越可能向上盈余管理、美化业绩。大股东资金占用的上市公司为了避免投资者、监管部门等将公司业绩恶化归咎于其非法的"掏空"行为,从而竭力延迟坏消息、进行盈余管理、虚增收益。

The paper collects manually the data of controlling shareholder expropriation of listed companies in Chinese capital markets to empirically study the behavior mode from controlling shareholder expropriation（or tunneling） to widow dressing by earnings management of financial statements when facing performance dilemma.The results show that for listed companies dropping in performance dilemma,they are more likely to manage earnings upward to obtain better performance when controlling shareholder expropriation is more serious.Listed companies with controlling shareholder expropriation try to delay the bad news and inflate profits by earnings management in order to escape the blame of investors and supervisors.