创新竞争与垄断内生——兼议中国反垄断法的根本性裁判准则

Innovative Competition and Endogenous Monopoly——A Judging Principle of Chinese Anti-trust Law

创新与垄断之间的关系是经济学界争议最多的课题之一,但以往的实证研究结果一直莫衷一是。为此,本文构建了一个动态的创新和产量竞争模型,研究结果表明:在不同的产业发展阶段,创新与垄断的关系是动态变化的;从长远看,创新与垄断正相关,熊彼特假说成立。垄断势力可以是创新和产量竞争的市场内生结果,创新竞争导致垄断内生。而且,这种市场内生的垄断与社会总福利、消费者剩余相辅相成、并行不悖,是产业发展的社会合意结果。据此,本文提出:企业因合法经营和技术创新而获得的垄断势力是合法的,垄断是否市场内生可以作为我国反垄断执法机构裁判"合法垄断"和"非法垄断"的根本性司法准则。

The relation between innovation and monopoly is the most referenced topic in economics, but the existing empirical study is always statistically insignificant or unrobust. The paper establishes a dynamic model on company＇s innovative competition and coumot competition. The model shows that, the relation between innovation and monopoly is on dynamic changing with industry＇s development, and then proves Scbumpeterian hypothesis in long-term views. The paper also shows monopoly is a endogenous consequence of market mechanism and industrial long-term evolution. Monopoly, consumer-surplus and social welfare supported each other in long-term view. So monopoly is desirable to social welfare. Based on our research findings, we suggest that monopoly is endogenous or exogenous from market should be the fundamental judging principle of Chinese anti-trust law. If a company get monopoly power from its legal management and innovation, monopoly power should be legitimate.