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集体林地使用权流转的利益相关者博弈分析 被引量:6

A Game Analysis of Behavior of Stakeholders in the Collective Forestland Usufruct Transfer
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摘要 分析了集体林地使用权流转过程中各利益相关者的博弈关系,基于经典博弈理论构建了林管部门、村干部、农户3方动态博弈模型对其博弈关系加以分析,研究结果表明:林地使用权流转的最优均衡解为林管部门鼓励林地使用权流转,村干部积极配合流转,农户积极参与流转。集体林地使用权流转是林管部门、村集体、流转农户等多元利益主体间利益关系动态博弈的过程;为激励和促进林地使用权流转,需建立公平有效的流转利益分配及奖惩机制,进一步深化林权制度改革和完善配套改革,以及完善林地使用权流转服务体系。 The purpose of this paper is to analyze the game relationships among stakeholders in the process of collective forestland usufruct transfer, and to provide some suggestions for the decision--makers to regulate the behaviors and improve the transfer mechanism. The dynamic game model of transfer among forestry department, village cadre and household is constructed based on the classical game theory. The results indicate that the optimal equilibrium is that the forestry department actively encourages the transfer, village cadre positively cooperate with the department, and household actively participates in the transfer. The collective forestland usufruct transfer is a dynamic game process among stakeholders, and the key countermeasures to encourage and promote the transfer is to establish fair and effec- tive mechanism of benefit distribution, rewards and punishments for transfer, further deepen the forest property right system reform, complete the relative reform, and improve the transfer service system of forestland usufruct.
出处 《绿色科技》 2011年第6期220-224,共5页 Journal of Green Science and Technology
基金 国家社会科学基金青年项目--林权制度改革跟踪研究(编号:09CJY010)资助 中国博士后科学基金面上项目--农户林地使用权转行为研究(编号:20090450395)资助
关键词 林地使用权 均衡解 博弈论 流转 利益相关者 forestland usufruct equilibrium solutions game theory transfer stakeholders
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