摘要
管理层薪酬契约是建立企业盈余管理约束机制的重要环节。本文从管理层薪酬契约的角度出发,以06年到08年间沪、深两地的上市公司为样本,采用修正的截面Jones模型计算可操控性应计利润作为盈余管理程度的代理变量,建立多元回归模型对管理层年薪和股权激励与上市公司盈余管理程度之间的关系进行了实证研究。
Management compensation is an important part of the constrain mechanisms for the earnings management.The listed companies during the period of 2006-2008 are chosen as research samples both in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from angle of the management compensation contracts,the modified Jones model is used to calculate the discretionary accruals which is used to measure the extent of earnings management.Then a regression model for the examining the relationship among management salaries,management shareholding,and earnings management is constructed.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第6期133-139,共7页
Science Research Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772087):2008.01-2010.12
教育部人文社科基金资助项目(06JA790012):2006.03-2008.02
大连理工大学人文社科基金资助项目(DUTHS2007302):2009.01-2010.12
关键词
盈余管理
管理层薪酬契约
股权激励
可操控性应计利润
earnings management
management compensation contract
stock incentive
discretionary accruals
