不对称信息下商业银行的行为选择——基于房地产在建工程抵押贷款的博弈

Behavior Choices of Commercial Banks with Asymmetric Information——on Game of Mortgage Loan to Construction of Real Estate in Progress

在房地产在建工程抵押贷款业务中,商业银行在两个市场上均处于信息劣势的地位,因而存在相应的风险。基于银行针对评估机构委托评估前的逆向选择和银行面临开发公司抵押投贷后的道德风险的主要风险经验归纳,分别运用博弈模型对两个市场的策略互动行为进行了理论研究,实证结果表明存在市场失灵、资源配置效率次优。根据相关理论和市场实践得出商业银行的规范性行为改进有效对策为:通过提供最优激励合约、招投标机制以识别合格努力的评估机构,给予激励相容式的委托;在项目评估和企业审核的基础上,确定合适的贷款抵押率、完善贷款资金的账户管理、进行抵押登记的连续性操作,适时、适当地实现贷款受偿。

There are several kinds of risks to bank be- cause of it＇s subordinate information position in two markets in mortgage loan to real estate construction in progress. The interactions in two markets were respectively analyzed theo- retically by the game models based on the inductive of main risks experience of reverse selection between bank and as- sessment agency and moral hazard between bank and real es- tate developer, the result is there were market failure and non-optimal efficiency of resource allocation. Conclusion can be accord to the models and practices drawn of bank to im- prove iCs situation positively as following： to supply optimal contract of stimulation and bid mechanism to distinguish qualified agency for entrusting with compatible stimulation; to assess item and check enterprise, choose appropriate D/ V, improve bill management and register mortgage continu- ously, recover loan suitably in time.