考虑战略顾客行为带预算约束的多产品报童问题

Multi-Product Newsvendor Problem with Budget Constraint and Strategic Customers

动态定价策略的广泛使用使得越来越多的顾客呈现战略性的特点,即顾客在决定购买时机时不仅会考虑当前的价格是否超过其心理预留价格,同时也会考虑到等到降价时再购买产品的可能性,从而延迟购买决策。研究了一类考虑顾客战略行为且带有预算约束的多产品报童问题,引入理性预期均衡分析,得到了报童和战略顾客双方静态博弈时的理性预计均衡解,并进一步分析了数量承诺对于均衡数量和均衡价格的影响。分析了最优解的性质并给出了求解算法,最后通过数值算例对模型的结论进行了验证。

The widespread use of dynamic pricing strategy has trained customers to be more and more strategic,that is,when customers time their purchase,they not only consider whether the price offered is beyond their reservation prices,but also consider the possibility of getting it when the price is marked down,therefore,they may delay their purchase.A class of multi-product newsvendor problem with a budget constraint when considering strategic customer behavior is studied.The rational expectation equilibrium analysis is introduced and the rational expectation equilibrium solution to the static game between the newsvendor and the strategic customers is obtained.The impact of quantity commitment on the equilibrium quantity and equilibrium price is further analyzed.The properties of the optimal solutions are analyzed and a solution procedure is also presented.At last,numerical examples are given to illustrate the conclusions of the proposed model.