独立董事独立性、关联交易与公司价值——基于沪深两市上市公司的经验证据

Independence of Independent Directors,Related Party Sale and Firm Value: Evidence from the China Stock Market

要求独立董事对关联交易进行监管政策的出台,创造了基于关联交易研究独立董事监督职能的机会。基于此,在研究独立董事独立性对公司异常关联销售和公司价值的影响后发现,独立董事独立性的提高有助于抑制异常关联销售的发生。《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》颁布以后,异常关联销售的比率降低,且更为"干净"。独立董事独立性对异常关联销售的抑制不仅是政策作用的直接结果,而且确实有助于提高经济效益。

With the release of the policy concerning independent directors＇ supervision over related transaction,we find an opportunity to study the supervision function of independent directors based on the related transaction.Based on this,after studying the impact of the independence of independent directors on the company＇s irregular related sales and firm value,we find such enhanced independence is helpful to prevent the occurrence of the irregular related transaction.After the release of Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of Independent Directors System,the irregular related sales decreases and such sales also become ＂cleaner＂.The restraint from the independence of independent directors on the irregular related party sale in China is not only the direct result of the policy＇s impact,but also it can promote the economic efficiency.