阶段融资、再谈判与风险投资企业控制权的配置

Stage financing,renegotiation and the allocation of control rights in venture investment firms

本文在阶段融资架构下,针对项目的不同初始发展前景预期,结合随阶段进程的信息揭示,分析了各种情况下的控制权最优初始配置以及随阶段进程的调整与再谈判.研究结果表明,控制权最优初始配置不仅与项目发展前景的初始预期有关,而且与风险投资企业的股权配置也有关;在再谈判时刻,不同信号对项目发展前景初始预期的更新决定了风险投资家的最优阶段投资决策以及阶段时刻控制权的最优调整.研究结论解释了Kaplan等(2003,2004)关于项目发展前景、风险投资企业股权配置与控制权动态配置关系的实证结果.

This paper analyzes the optimal initial allocation of control right and renegotiations after information revealing under different expectations of project prospects in the framework of stage financing.It is shown that, the optimal initial allocation of control right is relevant to both the initial expectation of project prospects and the share proportion of the venture investment films.The expectation updating determines the optimal reallocation of the control right in the second stage financing.The results provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical evidences of Kaplan Str（o｜¨）mberg（2003,2004） about the impact of project prospects on the dynamic allocation of control rights.