关系、道德风险与经理人有效激励

Relation,Moral Hazard,and Effective Managerial Incentives

本文主要从经理人道德风险的视角分析了公司治理中的关系与经理人有效激励。经理人既可能有私下隐藏企业收益的道德风险,又可能有偷懒的道德风险。本文的分析表明:第一,在存在经理人私下隐藏企业收益的道德风险的情况下,经理人薪酬合约中与企业绩效挂钩的奖金部分(分成比例)随关系强度的增加而减小。第二,在存在经理人偷懒的道德风险的情况下,当关系强度小于某个临界值时,经理人薪酬合约中与企业绩效挂钩的奖金部分(分成比例)不随关系强度的变化而变化;当关系强度大于某个临界值时,经理人薪酬合约中与企业绩效挂钩的奖金部分(分成比例)随关系强度的增大而增大。第三,在存在经理人双重道德风险的情况下,经理人薪酬合约中与企业绩效挂钩的奖金部分(分成比例)随关系强度的增大而减小。我们首先需要弄清楚企业所有者所面临的经理人道德风险主要是什么类型的,然后才能设计具有针对性的经理人薪酬合约。

This paper mainly analyzes relation and bonus design of executive compensition contract in corporate governance from the perspective of managerial moral hazard.There are two kinds of managerial moral hazard.One refers to the manager’s diversion,the other refers to the manager’s shirking.Our analyses show that when there is diversion-type mana-gerial moral hazard,the bonus decreases with the strength of relation,and that when there is shirking-type managerial moral hazard,the bonus does not vary with the strength of rela-tion if the strength of relation is less than a critical value,while increases with the strength of relation if the strength of relation is more than a critical value,and that when there is double managerial moral hazard,the bonus decreases with the strength of relation.When the firm-owner decides to design an executive compensition contract,he should identify different types of managerial moral hazard in the first place.