产业组织视角下零售商通道费行为

Slotting Allowance Behavior of Retailers in the Perspective of Industrial Organization

将一次性支付的通道费与产业链产量相联系,利用斯坦尔伯格博弈逻辑考察零售商通道费行为与上下游厂商谈判势力的关系以及该行为对于产业链效率的影响.研究结果表明,零售商通道费行为可以改善产业链效率,具体表现为零售商利润与产业链总利润随零售商买方势力增强而增加,但供应商收益会受到损害.特别地,零售商可以选择通道费策略以使产业链利润始终保持在纵向一体化水平,而上下游厂商的利润分配由零售商买方势力外生决定.总体来看,零售商通道费行为作用下的均衡结果优于Spengler双重加价模型,对产业链效率、消费者剩余和社会福利有利.

A model which connects lump sum slotting fee and industrial output was built to study the relationship between the retailer＇s buyer power and its slotting allowance behavior.The effects of slotting allowance behavior on the efficiency of the industrial chain were analyzed using Stackelberg game logic.The results showed that the retailer＇s slotting allowance behavior can improve the industrial chain efficiency.The retailer＇s profit and the total industrial chain profit will be enhanced with the increased retailer＇s buyer power.However,this will harm the manufacturer＇s profit.The retailer can choose a special form of slotting allowance to maximize the industrial chain efficiency to the vertical integration level.The distribution of profit between the manufacturer and the retailer will be exogenously decided by the retailer＇s buy power.Comparing with the Spengler＇s model,the retailer＇s slotting allowance behavior will benefit the total industry efficiency,the consumer surplus and the social welfare as a whole.