摘要
在我国当前快速城市化的进程中,城镇的快速发展要求基础设施供给水平的不断提高,而农村因为缺少有效的利益诉求渠道导致基础设施供给严重不足。地方政府官员自身利益最大化取决于其经济绩效,以及其政绩经由媒介传播而被上级政府或辖区居民感知的程度。大众媒介受自身利益结构制约而形成的信息供给上的城市偏好,扭曲了地方政府官员激励机制,引致了地方政府官员在基础设施供给决策上的城市偏好。通过改变大众媒介信息供给上的城市偏好,弱化地方政府官员决策中的城市偏好,可以促进农村基础设施供给水平的提高。
In the process of rapid urbanization, towns needs higher infrastructure supply level, but rural areas infrastructure supply was in shortage because villagers lack the channels of benefit appeals. Local government officials" maximum benefit depends on economic performance, and their achievements be- ing perceived by higher level governments and residents through mass media. Mass media's urban bias in information supply which is bound by its own benefit structure, distorted local government officials incentive mechanism, which in turn causes local government officials" urban bias in infrastructure sup- ply decisions. Changing urban bias in mass media information supply, weakening urban bias in local government officials" decision, can promote the level of rural infrastructure supply.
出处
《武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第3期337-343,共7页
Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition
基金
国家社会科学研究基金项目(10BGL093)
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(08JC790077)
武汉大学自主科研项目(人文社会科学)研究成果
"中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金"资助(105275990)