扩张企业对外负债的多方进化博弈——基于贝叶斯法则

An Evolution Game with Multi-stakeholder of Enterprise Development on Debt: Based on Bays Rules

企业举债扩张发展过程中与银行、政府的借、贷、管博弈问题需要研究。从本文假设出发,应用不完全信息静态博弈理论,得到企业在银行—企业贷款博弈中具有后动优势的结论;应用不完全信息动态博弈理论及其贝叶斯法则,通过求证银行收益类型的先验概率与后验概率的关系及其承接方式,并建立银行向企业贷款的风险评价体系,得出银行贷款与企业还债的最优概率以及企业是博弈均衡结果的最终决定者的结论;应用完全信息动态博弈理论,对政府、企业、银行三方进行博弈分析,得出政府在银行向企业贷款与企业向银行还债的博弈中扮演负债终结负责者角色的结论。本文对银行与企业及其他市场主体的信贷交易行为研究具有理论创新价值与实际指导意义。

In the process of enterprise development on debt,the game between enterprise（borrower）,bank（lender） and government（administrator） should be taken into consideration.Starting from the assumption in the paper,it is concluded that enterprises have late-mover advantages in the Bank-Enterprise Loan Game based on static game theory of incomplete information.This research not only finds the optimal probability of bank loans and enterprise debt,and but also makes the conclusion that enterprises have the final decision in this game by adopting the dynamic game of incomplete information and its Bays rules,investigating the relations between prior probability and posterior probability of different types of bank earnings and their transition methods,and establishing the risk assessment system of lending money to enterprises.Through the analysis of the roles of enterprise,bank and government in this game based on the dynamic game with complete information,it is obvious that government plays the role of Personin-charge in the consequence of this game.This paper throws new light on the loan game between banks and enterprises and other market players as well for its theoretical and practical value.