信息泄漏情形下企业研发决策行为

Enterprice's R&D Decision Behavior under the Circumstance of Information Leakage

尽管研发外包可以降低研发投资风险,然而,由于信息泄漏会侵蚀企业部分市场份额,因而企业在进行研发决策时面临着内部研发和研发外包之间的权衡。鉴于此,本文构建一个信息泄漏情形下企业研发决策的博弈模型,运用演化博弈理论分析企业研发策略的动态均衡,并对参数进行数值模拟分析,以此揭示信息泄漏对企业研发决策的影响机理。结果表明:信息泄漏对企业市场份额的侵蚀程度对企业研发决策行为的演化产生至关重要的影响。本文对各种演化情形进行了详细地分析和阐述,可以为企业研发决策提供参考。

RD Outsourcing has the advantage of reducing RD investment risks,but information leakage will erode part of enterprise＇s market share,so enterprises may face trade-off between internal RD and RD outsourcing when making decisions.In view of this,this paper constructed an enterprise＇s RD decisions game model under information leakage, using the evolutionary game theory to analyze the dynamic equilibrium of enterprise＇s RD strategy under the circumstance of information leakage,through numerical simulating the parameters to reveal the border of RD Outsourcing under the circumstance of information leakage.The results ineicated that：Erosion rate of market share caused by information leakage has significant influence on the evolution of enterprise＇s RD decision behavior.This paper analyzed several evolution situations in detail,it can provide reference for enterprise＇s RD decisions.