不完全信息动态博弈下发电企业投资的A-J效应及其策略研究

Research on A-J Effect and Strategy of Power Generation Enterprise Investment under Dynamic Game Theory of Incomplete Information

论文研究在不完全信息动态博弈下发电企业投资的A-J效应及投资策略问题。通过分析发电企业与规制机构的不完全信息动态博弈过程,认为发电企业在规制期内,并非一定会投资过剩。规制机构对有效资产的认可程度以及负债率增大而产生的额外成本会形成一种内在约束,约束发电企业的过剩投资行为。同时,在考虑规制机构有效资产认可程度,银行贷款利率及投资回报率三方面因素,发电企业会根据不同条件来调整自身的投资策略,决定是否来过剩投资或者以行业平均成本来投资。同时在不同的投资策略下发电企业存在着一个最优负债率来保证其利润。这既是对A-J效应的一个补充和完善,同时也为目前发电企业解决负债率偏高问题提供思路。

This paper studies A-J effect and investment strategy of power generation enterprises investment under dynamic game theory of incomplete information.Through analyzing the process about dynamic game of incomplete information for power generation enterprise and regulating organization,this paper considers that the electricity power enterprise will not invest surplus within the regulation period.The degree of recognition for effective assets by regulating organization and the additional costs generated by increasing debt ratio will form an internal constraint to limit the excessive investment behaviors of power generation enterprise.Meanwhile,in considering three factors,i.e.the degree of recognition for the effective assets by regulating organization,bank lending rates and return on investment,the power generation enterprise will adjust its investment strategy based on the different conditions,deciding whether to invest on excessive cost or industry average cost.At the same time,the power generation enterprises under different investment strategies have an optimal debt ratio to ensure its profit.It＇s a supplement and improvement to the A-J effect,but also provides ideas for power generation enterprise to resolve the high debt ratio.