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虚构对象实在论的语义辩护 被引量:2

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摘要 关于虚构对象,实在论者认为,指称虚构对象现象构成支持实在论的证据。反实在论者则试图表明,无需坚持实在论,也能解释该现象。针对五种反实在论策略,即罗素式反实在论策略、弗雷格式反实在论策略、亚当斯式反实在论策略、布洛克式反实在论策略和埃弗雷特式反实在论策略,本文分别进行反驳。最终说明,指称虚构对象现象仍将作为支持实在论的证据。
作者 徐敏
出处 《世界哲学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第4期133-142,共10页 World Philosophy
基金 国家社科基金青年项目<虚构对象理论前沿研究>(项目编号:10CZX032) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目<二阶模态公理化虚构对象理论SMLM>(项目编号:2010QN068) 华中科技大学人文社科基金青年项目<科学哲学视角下的虚构对象研究>(项目编号:2009011)的资助
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参考文献21

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同被引文献20

  • 1Berto, F. , 2009, "Impossible worlds", in E. N. Zalta ( ed. ), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http : //plato. stanford. edu/archives/fall2009/entries/impossible-worlds.
  • 2Everett, A. , 2005, "Against fictional realism", in Journal of Philosophy 102 (12).
  • 3Frege, G., 1948, "Sense and reference", in The Philosophical Review 57 (3).
  • 4Kripke, S.A., 1971, "Semantical considerations on modal logic", in L. Linsky (ed.), Reference and Modality, London: Oxford University Press.
  • 5Kripke, S.A., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • 6Lewis, D. , 1968, "Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic", in Journal of Philosophy 65 (5).
  • 7Lewis, D. ,1983, "Truth in fiction", in his Philosophical Papers-Volume I, Oxford University Press.
  • 8Lewis, D. ,1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
  • 9Quine, W. v. , 1961, "On what there is", in hisFrom A Logical Point of View, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • 10Russell, B., 1905, "On denoting", in Mind 14 (56).

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