商业银行运营效率与董事会治理

Operating Efficiency and Board Governance of Commercial Banks

本文在对中国16家上市商业银行绩效进行前沿效率分析的基础上,建立以董事会规模、外部董事监事占比、CEO薪酬和管理层人均薪酬为基础的二元选择模型,对中国商业银行运营效率同董事会治理的关系进行了实证研究。结果表明,独立董事在商业银行公司治理中的作用并不明显,CEO薪酬和董事会规模对商业银行业绩并无显著影响,董事会规模过大无益于商业银行经营效率的提高。值得注意的是,管理层人均薪酬的增加有助于银行效率的提高,因此应在差异化平均基础上设计管理层激励与约束机制,完善CEO薪酬和其他高管人员激励体系设计。

Based on the analysis of the efficiency frontiers of 16 listed Chinese commereial banks＇ performance, this paper builds a binary, choice model, which is based on board size, proportion of external directors and supervisors, CEO＇s compensation and average compensation of the management, and makes an empirical study of the relationship of operational efficiency and board governance of Chinese commercial banks. Tile results show that independent director＇s influence on the governance of commercial bank is not obvious, CEO＇ s compensation and board size don＇t significantly affect the performance of commercial bank, too large a board is not condueive to the improvement of operating efficiency. It is noteworthy that the increase of average eompensation of the management will help bank to improve its efficiency. Therefore, commercial banks should design the incentive and restraint mechanism of the management on the basis of average difference and improve the design of incentive compensation system of the CEO and other senior management.