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弃核决策:安全、收益与规范路径 被引量:1

The States' Decisions of Forgoing Nuclear Weapons:Approaches in Terms of Security,Gains and Norms
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摘要 本文评述了不同理论流派对国家为何放弃发展核武器这一问题的解释。现实主义认为国家安全威胁的消失或者核大国的安全保障将导致国家弃核。新自由制度主义强调收益计算,认为核武器的战略优势被夸大了,发展核武器并不符合大多数国家的利益。建构主义认为观念、国家身份与核不扩散规范有助于说服国家弃核,但混淆了规范说服与弃核决策之间必要性与充分性的关系。鉴于现有防扩散的理论研究集中在控制核武器向无核国家的扩散,从理论层面研究核大国的核承诺、核裁军以及核能利用对核不扩散的发展有着重大意义。 In this paper,the author reviews and evaluates the arguments of different theoretical schools on why states choose to forgo nuclear weapons.Realism ignore the role of national identity,security cognition and international norm on nuclear decision-making.Constructivism thinks that idea,national identity and nonproliferation norm are helpful to convince states to forgo their nuclear program,but confuses necessity with sufficiency in the relationship of normative persuasion and decision-making of forgoing nuclear weapons.Since existing researches focus on controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries,it is significant and beneficial to study theoretically the role of the nuclear powers' nuclear commitment,nuclear disarmament and nuclear energy exploitation in nonproliferation.
作者 颜琳
出处 《国际论坛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第4期16-20,79,共5页 International Forum
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