社会资本规制与产权安排的替代效用和替代规则

Substitution Utilities and Substitution Rules between Social Capital Governance and Property Rights Arrangement

按照科斯定理的逻辑,可以证明社会资本规制与产权安排具有相互替代的效用;而两者之间的替代规则,可以在交易成本理论的平台上,从交易的频率、专用性、异质性三个维度进行刻画;对于现实中的社会资本规制和产权安排的互补现象,也可以通过交易成本递增和外部性分析,在满足两者效用替代的基础上得到解释。

Based on the Coase Theorem,this paper proves that there is a utility relationship of substitution between social capital governance and property rights arrangement.The substitution rules can be explained,on the platform of transaction cost theory,from three dimensions of transaction frequency,specificity,and heterogeneity.Moreover,the complementation phenomenon in the reality between social capital governance and property rights arrangement can also be explained through an analysis of the transaction cost increase by degree and the externalities on the basis of satisfying the utility substitution of the two.