胡塞尔的形式-材料图式与先验构造的问题

Husserl's Form-Material Schema and the Problem of Transcendental Constitution

作为描述意向体验之构造成就的基本方式,形式-材料图式为现象学的意向分析提供了基本框架。但胡塞尔对于形式-材料图式的态度是成问题的。一方面,他强调形式-材料图式在整个现象学领域始终起作用;另一方面则作了某种限制和保留,他察觉到,并非任何一个构造都具有形式-材料图式,它不适用于内时间意识领域的构造分析。因此,在构造问题上,意向性的较高层次与较深的时间层次之间存在一种冲突。只有遵循现象学回返起源的步伐、深入发生的向度才能消解这一冲突,最终,我们才能形成一个统一的先验构造的概念。

The Form-Material Schema is the basic method to describe the constitutional achievements of intentional experience and provides the basic framework to phenomenology for intentional analysis. But Husserl＇s attitude for it is problematic. On the one hand, he stressed that the Form-Material Schema in the field of phenomenology always worked. On the other hand, he made certain restrictions and reservations. He noticed that not all constitution had the form-Material Schema, and it did not apply to the areas within time consciousness for constitutional analysis. Therefore, as for constitution, there is a conflict between the higher levels of intentionality and the deeper layers of time. Only by following phenomenological paces to return to origins and furthering the dimension of genesis, can this conflict be resolved. Finally, we can obtain a unified concept of transcendental constitution.