自身欺罔与价值欺罔——舍勒现象学论域中的“欺罔”问题

Self-Illusion and Value-Illusion——The problem of "illusion" in the fields of Max Scheler's phenomenological thesis

对"欺罔"("自身欺罔"和"价值欺罔")的现象学反省在舍勒整个现象学时期占据着极为重要的位置。与"自身被给予"相对,"欺罔"在本质上意味着一种不恰当的被给予方式,"自身欺罔"或"价值欺罔"则意味着一种不恰当的"自身"或"价值"的被给予方式。舍勒对这一问题的现象学反思与其现象学研究的诸多领域密切相关,他的最终目的是在各个问题领域内的"去-欺罔"。舍勒对"自身欺罔"和"价值欺罔"的批评,构成其认识论、交互主体性现象学、现象学伦理学以及他对现代资本主义道德的现象学批判分析的基础。

The phenomenological reflection on ＂illusion＂ （ ＂self-illusion＂ and ＂value-illusion＂ ） occupies an extremely important position in Max Scheler＇s whole phenomenology. In contrast with ＂self-givenness＂, ＂illusion＂ essentially means an inappropriate way of being given, and ＂self-illusion＂ or ＂value-illusion＂ correspondingly means the inappropriate way of being given of ＂self＂ or ＂value＂. Scheler＇s phenomenologieal reflection on them is closely related to several fields of his phenomenological research. And, Scheler＇s ultimate goal is to reach the ＂disillusion＂ in all these fields. His critiques on ＂self-Jllusion＂ and ＂value-JlJusJon＂ form the basis of his epistemology, Ihe pbenomenology of inter-subjectivity, pbenomenological ethics and of his critically pbenomenologieal analysis of modern capitalist moral.