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大学教师薪酬激励合约的理论分析 被引量:5

A Theoretical Analysis of Wage Incentive Contracts for College Teachers
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摘要 大学教师薪酬合约可分为基于产出的薪酬合约和基于投入的薪酬合约。基于产出的薪酬合约包括基于个体绩效绝对产出的薪酬合约、基于个体绩效相对产出的薪酬合约以及基于团队绩效产出的薪酬合约。基于投入的薪酬合约包括计时薪酬合约和人力资本薪酬合约。每一种形式的薪酬合约各有其优点、局限和适用条件,高等学校要结合自身性质和特点选择适当的薪酬合约,一般情况下学校需要同时采用多种薪酬合约形式。 There are two kinds of wage contracts for college teachers: one based-on output and the other based-on input.The former contract includes the one based-on absolute/ relative output of individual performance,and the one based-on the output of group performance.The latter contract is mainly classified into time-wage contract and human-capital contract.Each kind of contract has its advantage,limitation and applied condition.A college should make full consideration of its own character and choose the right wage contract.Generally speaking,the college should adopt various kinds of wage contracts at the same time.
作者 李福华
出处 《高等教育研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第6期31-35,共5页 Journal of Higher Education
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJA880071) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71073089)
关键词 大学 教师 薪酬 合约 college teacher wage contract
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