大股东掏空行为监管的进化博弈分析

A Game Analysis of the Evolution of the Supervision of the Tunneling Behavior of Block Shareholders

在一个简单的框架下,笔者运用进化博弈理论从监督的角度分析了大股东与监管当局的博弈关系。博弈的复制动态方程分析表明:监管当局的超额收益、正常收益、大股东的掏空金额、租金等初始条对博弈均衡的结果都将产生影响。借鉴瓦尔拉斯一般均衡分析范式得出,不同的掏空金额会导致博弈双方出现多重均衡,但并非所有均衡点都具有安定性。

In a simple framework, the authors established an evolutionary game model from the view of supervision to analyze the relationship between block shareholder and the authority. The results of the replicated dynamics equation show that the initial conditions of the excess gains and normal income of the authority, tunneling amount and the rent of the block shareholders all affect result of the game equilibrium ; The reference to Walras＇ s general equilibrium analysis model inferred that different amounts of tunneling cause different equilibrium points, but not all the points are stable.