控股股东对过度投资影响的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

The Impact of Controlling Shareholder on Over-investment——Empirical Evidence from China's Listed Companies

企业的股权结构并不能直接影响企业的价值,把两者联系起来的纽带是企业的投资行为,因此研究股权结构对投资的影响可以更好地揭示两者之间的关系。以中国上市公司的股权集中制为出发点,通过对控股股东的控制权、现金流权以及两权分离程度与过度投资之间关系的研究发现:中国上市公司的控股股东对公司兼具支持与掏空双重影响。但总的来说,对控制权私有收益的追逐使得控股股东对上市公司的掏空行为更具有长期性。

Investment is usually regarded as the link between share structure and corporate value, because share struc- ture can not directly affect investment. This paper starts with the equity centralism of listed companies in China, empirically studies the relationship between controlling shareholder＇ cash right , control right and abruption of them with over - invest- ment behavior. Verify that controlling shareholders have not only trend of hollowing listed companies, but also effect of sus- taining them.