地市级地区间基本建设公共支出的相互影响

On the Interactions of Local Public Infrastructure Expenditure in China

本文考察中国地市级地区间基本建设公共支出相互影响的机制和特征,主要包括溢出效应和竞争效应。由于地市级基本建设支出的正外部性,溢出效应使得相邻地区基本建设支出间负相关;由于中国特有的地方官员激励结构,地区间经济增长的竞争会导致基本建设公共支出正相关。本文使用中国地市级地区2002—2005年数据检验这两个影响渠道。经验分析发现了溢出效应和竞争效应存在的证据。

This paper discusses theoretically and empirically channels through which local public infrastructure expenditure interaction in China. On one hand, local governments have the incentive to expand infrastructure investment to pump up GDP growth rate ; on the other hand, the positive externality of infrastructure investment will give adjacent areas the urge to take ＂free ride＂, resulting in downfall of infrastructure investment in these areas. Two different types of adjacency matrix are choosed to identify interactions. Using Chinese prefecture areas data from 2002 to 2005, the results show that areas within the same province exhibit positive correlation in public infrastructure expenditure, while adjacent areas geographically exhibit negative correlation.