摘要
运用博弈工具分析我国互联网低俗内容监管,是为了从理论上真正搞清楚这样一个问题,即通过监管是否能够防止低俗内容在互联网上广泛传播。以博弈的视角对低俗内容的来源——内容提供商、平台服务提供商及以政府为主导的监管方的相关行为进行分析,在三者之间建立博弈模型,通过对其均衡解的分析揭示互联网内容监管的可行性。结论是肯定的,即互联网低俗内容监管机构与内容平台提供商之间能够实现(不检查,不违规)这一理想均衡状态,同时还可以采取措施避免另外两种均衡(不检查,违规)和(检查,违规)的出现。尽管我国互联网低俗内容监管的现状并不如此,但通过多样化的监管措施,防止互联网服务商违规是可实现的。
To analyze the Internet supervision in China based on game theory model is to figure out whether the government can prevent the "vulgar" content on the Internet by enhancing administration and supervision.Chapter four analyzes the sources of the "vulgar" content-Internet content provider(ICP) and Internet presence provider(IPP),and the regulator-the government and administrative departments from a game theory perspective.To build the game theory model respectively for the above-mentioned three parties,this essay will reveal the feasibility of the Internet supervision through the analysis of the equilibrium solution.The answer is positive,that is,the regulator and ICP can keep a state of equilibrium,which means no inspection and no violation,and they can also avoid the other two equilibrium states-no inspection while violation,and inspection while violation.Although the equilibrium state has not achieved in China,we can prevent the violation conducted by Internet service provides through various supervision measures.
出处
《电信科学》
北大核心
2011年第7期52-58,共7页
Telecommunications Science
关键词
互联网
低俗内容
监管博弈
可行性
Internet
vulgar content
game analysis of supervision
feasibility