“后危机”时代我国商业银行地方政府融资平台贷款风险及防控对策

An Analysis for Default Risks of Government Financing Entities is the Post-Financial Crisis and the Relative Countermeasures

地方政府融资平台是我国特殊经济环境和政策背景下的产物,是后危机时代关注的焦点。为有效应对2008年危机,我国政府推出了一系列经济刺激计划,同时各地政府也纷纷组建各类融资平台机构,进行大规模的融资活动。如此快速的巨额融资规模增长,不仅加大了地方政府债务负担,也对银行业经营风险形成显著的潜在压力,导致政府信用风险和银行信贷风险急剧放大,引起了学术界、监管当局和政府的高度关注。本文建立了政府偿债能力、偿债意愿、借款主体、项目本身、行业投向以及宏观经济6个风险信息维度,引入层次分析法建立评分体系,采用国际通用评级主标尺,全方面对地方政府融资平台贷款项目的信贷风险进行识别、度量、监测和控制,为我国商业银行政府融资平台公司贷款的风险度量和信贷投放决策提供了一个理论和应用指导工具。

In order to deal with the crisis,Chinese government designed and implemented a basket of economy stimulation plans,including giant volume of government investment which,in most cases,is financed through Government-Financing-Entities（GFE） . GFE,partially founded and backed by the local government has legitimate stands to act like a company to finance,investment,and get independent profit. They combine promising properties to attract every player in China in post-crisis economic environment. While GFEs would be appreciated in term of its contribution to the economy,its down-side risks should not be overlooked. Some of the GFEs,if not most,have limited ability to generate positive cash flow in order to meet the payment requirement for the loan since its operation is infrastructural,public service,and non-profiting in nature. As a result,the repayments for bank loans are essentially loaded on local government. This process could have catastrophic macro-consequence to the economy as a whole,due to the handicapped taxation juristic locals. In this study,the default risks of GFE has been analyzed,modeled by AHP,followed by the suggestions to bring a humble light in loan decision making,policy establishment,and regulation issues in the area.