摘要
企业之间的关系由竞争变为竞合使企业合作竞争情报成为可能。运用博弈论中的囚徒困境模型分析了企业合作竞争情报的必要性;基于合作博弈中的最小强e-核心、N ash谈判解、Shapley值和Raiffa裁决解等解概念,构建了企业合作竞争情报成本分摊模型,并对四种模型结果运用非线性规划模型进行组合,给出最终成本分摊结果。实例表明,构建的企业合作竞争情报投资分摊模型切实可行,为企业合作竞争情报的实际操作提供了思路和方法。
The changing relationship between enterprises from competition to co-competition make enterprise cooperative competitive intelligence possible.The article applies prisoner's dilemma model of game theory to analyze the necessity of enterprise cooperative competitive intelligence.Based on the minimum strong ε-core,Nash negotiating solution,Shapley value and Raiffa ruling solution of game theory,it constructs cost allocation models of enterprise cooperative competitive intelligence,applies nonlinear optimization model to combine their results and output the final allocation result.An example testifies the feasibility of the proposed cost allocation models,which provides an idea and method for the actual operation of enterprise cooperative competitive intelligence.
出处
《情报杂志》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第7期22-25,共4页
Journal of Intelligence
关键词
博弈论
企业合作竞争情报
成本分摊
模型
game theory
enterprise cooperative competitive intelligence
cost allocation
models