金融危机中处置有问题银行的政策选择研究

The Research on Policy Options for Resolving Troubled Banks in Financial Crisis

选择有效处置有问题金融机构和不良资产的政策是政策制定者在应对金融危机时的关键问题,政策选择不仅影响处理危机的财政成本,也会影响金融机构未来的风险承担行为。本文提出了一个在信息不对称条件下分析政府处置有问题银行的各种政策选择的模型,通过考察各种政策的事后道德风险和事后财政成本,对这些政策进行了比较分析,并结合美国不良资产救助计划(TARP)实施重点的转变,说明了为什么股权注资比收购不良资产更有效。

Selecting the most efficient resolution for troubled financial institutions and their non-performing assets is a key concern for policymakers faced with a financial crisis. These policy options may have effects on the fiscal cost of resolving the crisis and the risk taking behaviors of financial institutions. This paper develops a model under asymmetric information to analyze the policy options for resolving bank failures. The moral hazard and fiscal cost of the policy options are compared in this paper. The results give a theoretical support for why the capital purchase is more efficient than NPL investment in the implementation of TARP.