中国农村金融市场中非价格信贷配给的理论和实证分析

Theoretical and Empirical Study of Non-price Credit Rationing in Rural Financial Market in China

本文建立农村金融市场中非价格信贷配给的理论分析框架,基于特殊设计的直接诱导式询问方法,对农户面临的非价格信贷配给机制进行调查和识别,并实证分析影响非价格信贷配给机制的因素。研究发现,农村利率市场化改革以来,农村金融机构并没有将灵活的利率差异化管理作为弥补潜在贷款损失的手段。当前农村金融市场中多种类型的非价格信贷配给机制并存,农村金融机构的信贷合约特征和放贷行为偏好使得一部分农户被配给出信贷市场,一部分农户主动退出信贷市场。农村金融机构倾向于与农村地区少数生产规模较大、具有稳定收入和身份特征的农户建立稳定的、以重复放贷为基础的信贷供给机制,不具备这些特征的农户将面临配给,这与利率管制时期的放贷行为并无本质差异。未来须调整仅仅以增加农村金融供给解决融资难题的改革思路,深入到市场结构、信贷合约和产品创新以及包括公司治理、风险甄别和内部管理机制在内的农村金融机构治理机制等微观层面的改革。

Based on the non-price credit rationing analytical framework in rural financial market of China, the paper explores the different kinds of non-price credit rationings and the affecting factors with the specific direct elicitation methodology. The result shows that rural financial institutions never utilize interest rate as means of offsetting the loss of potential credit risk after rural interest rate liberalization reform. Many different credit ra- tioning mechanisms coexist in rural financial market. The credit contract of rural banks make some farmers are denied access and someone voluntarily withdraws from the credit market. This supply behavior is similar to what they do under interest rate regulation. At last, the authors point out that the further rural financial market reform should deepen the micro-level reform including credit contract innovation and governance mechanism design such as market structure, corporate governance, risk screening and inner management.