基于学习效应与示范效应的银行金融创新监管机制设计

Analysis of Banking Financial Innovation Supervision Mechanism Based on the Learning Effect and Demonstrative Effect

在金融创新与金融监管的动态博弈过程中,存在着学习效应与示范效应,文章通过学习效应与示范效应模型的构建,解释了当前金融危机发生的根本原因,即创新过度而监管不足;并基于学习效应与示范效应进行银行金融创新的监管机制设计,即监管当局应建立严惩过度创新的强监管者信誉,银行应建立合理的金融创新的激励约束机制,而最关键的是引入考虑监管当局与银行双方博弈关系的预先承诺机制。

There are learning effect and demonstrative effect in the game. This paper explains the true cause of financial crisis by the design of learning effect and demonstrative effect model, namely, financial innovation excessive and financial regulator deficient. Then, this paper designs banking financial innovation supervision mechanism based on learning effect anddemonstrative effect： banking regulator should enforce its reputation, banking should establish rational prompting and restrict mechahism of financial innovation, most importantly, it should be import pre-commitment approach based on the relationship of bank- ing regulator and banking.