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溢出效应下军官晋升博弈模型分析

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摘要 部队的竞争环境基本为有溢出效应与无溢出效应相混合。无溢出效应情况下,军官们在谋求晋升优势过程中,会把全部心思用在工作业绩创造上,最终靠取得突出的业绩而赢得晋升。而在有溢出效应情况下,军官们出于对晋升后高待遇的追求,溢出效应最终将导致囚徒困境的形成,即军官们都选择利己作为策略,这对于部队整体建设来说是一种内耗。
出处 《军事经济研究》 2011年第7期23-25,共3页 Military Economic Research
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