摘要长期以来,融资难阻碍着中小企业的良性发展。文章基于中小企业异质性的视角,在Kiyotaki and Moore模型基础上进行改进：引入监控成本和企业异质性,构建了一个动态经济模型对中小企业融资难的问题进行分析。结果表明由于中小企业的监控成本较高,抵押资产变动幅度越大,在信息不对称情况下中小企业更容易受到外来冲击的影响。最后分析了互助担保和政府担保对企业应对冲击的影响。
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