高管权力、薪酬契约与国企改革——来自国有上市公司的实证研究

Executive Power,Compensation Contract and SOEs Reform——Evidence from Listed SOEs in China

建立有效的薪酬契约是国有企业改革的核心问题,而高管拥有的权力可能引发其在薪酬激励方面的自利行为。以2004-2008年的国有上市公司为研究样本,实证发现:国有企业高管的权力越大,不但能获得更高的薪酬水平,还攫取了更多的超额薪酬,并且拉大了高管层与普通员工之间的薪酬差距,表明国企高管的确通过权力的运用扭曲了薪酬激励机制。另外,虽然高管的薪酬业绩敏感性整体上呈现不对称特征,但那些拥有较高权力的同时又建立了政治联系的高管可能基于政治动因的考虑降低了薪酬粘性。进一步的研究显示,政府控制层级的提升和制度环境的改善一定程度上能够抑制国企高管攫取超额薪酬,但并不能有效约束薪酬差距的扩大。本文的研究结果有助于我们理解国有企业高管权力的经济后果,并为当前有关国企薪酬体制改革的政策导向提供了经验启示。

The Establishment of effective compensation contracts is the core issue of state-owned companies' reform,whereas chief executives' power may trigger its self-serving behavior in the compensation incentives.Based on data of State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs) through 2004-2008,we find that the greater the power of SOEs'chief executives is,the higher compensation and more excess pay they can get.The evidence shows that SOEs'chief executives distort compensation incentive mechanism through the exertion of power.Moreover,although chief executives' pay-performance sensitivity is sticky on the whole,those having both high power and political connection may consider lowering the stickiness based on political motives.Further studies also show that upgrading the administrative level and improving the institutional environment can inhibit the excess pay snatching to some extent,but it can not effectively constrain the expansion of the pay gap.Our study is not only conducive to understanding the economic consequences of the power of SOEs' chief executives,but also offers some experiences and inspirations in terms of the policy-making on SOEs' corporate governance and the systemic reform of executive compensation as well.