期刊文献+

非对称信息下环境可持续发展的补贴政策研究

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摘要 本文讨论在非对称信息条件下,补贴政策满足污染控制的边际私人成本等于边际社会收益的条件,并构建针对厂商竞争的补贴改进模型和补贴与收费相结合的随机处罚模型,使生产者的污染控制激励即取决于其自身的预期处罚也取决于其他生产者所承受的预期处罚。解决非对称信息条件下污染监控信息成本过高所导致的道德风险问题,实现私人决策与社会目标相匹配的结果,从而实现符合我国现实国情的经济与环境和谐可持续发展的目标。
出处 《中国农业银行武汉培训学院学报》 2011年第4期65-67,共3页 Journal of ABC Wuhan Management Institute
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