反垄断法私人执行的集团公益诉讼模式

The Collective Litigation of Public Interest Mode of Antitrust Private Enforcement

我国反垄断法私人执行的现行立法的模式和现有学术研究成果,多将惩罚性赔偿与私人执行结合的模式纳入个体利益激励模式的框架,该模式存在较大弊端。集团公益诉讼模式,通过扩大诉讼主体范围、限缩诉讼请求为公益性诉求,区分适用本身违法原则的垄断行为和适用合理性原则的垄断行为,在集团公益诉讼中前者可判处惩罚性赔偿,而后者不可判处惩罚性赔偿等制度设计,不仅可以避免个体利益激励模式的弊端,且符合反垄断法私人执行的价值功能,与反垄断法的公益性间保持协调一致,同时具有现实的可行性,故应作为反垄断法私人执行的新思路。

The current legislation and academic researches tend to put antitrust private enforcement with punitive damages into the framework of individual interests incentives mode;however,there are many drawbacks in this model.And the collective litigation of public interest mode,through expanding the scope of subject of proceedings,reducing claims to public welfare demands,distinguishing the monopolistic behavior according to their application between per se rule and principle of rationality—in collective litigation of public interest,the former may be imposed punitive damages,and the latter should not be imposed punitive damages.In this way,the collective litigation of public interest mode not only can avoid the drawbacks of the individual interests incentives mode,but also can accord with the public welfare value in antitrust law,it also has practical feasibility,so this mode should be used as a new idea of antitrust private enforcement.