摘要
在分析无灯控交叉口插车过程中驾驶员行为决策相互影响关系的基础上,从更小时空尺度出发,提出了考虑安全因素、速度因素的驾驶员插车行为过程效用函数,建立了基于动态重复博弈的无灯控交叉口驾驶员插车行为模型,分析了不同驾驶员类型组合在插车博弈过程中的纳什均衡及相应的驾驶员决策行为。结果表明:该模型能够在一定程度上反映不同条件下交通冲突的演化结果,说明了应用动态重复博弈进行驾驶员行为模型研究的合理性。
Based on analysis of the interaction between driver＇s action decisions when vehicle-cross action happens in the intersection without traffic light,considering safety factor and speed factor,the utility function for vehicle-cross action was also proposed,the dynamic reduplicate game model for driver vehicle-cross action in intersection without traffic light was built up.The Nash equilibrium for vehicle-cross game process with different combinations of driver and driver＇s corresponding decision action were analyzed.The result shows that the model is able to reflect evolution result of the traffic conflict on certain extent.It verifies the feasibility of studying vehicle-cross action by using dynamic reduplicate game theory.
出处
《中国公路学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第4期94-100,共7页
China Journal of Highway and Transport
基金
北京市教育委员会科技发展计划项目(KM200910009001)
北京市智能交通创新团队专项基金项目(7035-50420-05080201)
关键词
交通工程
无灯控交叉口
重复博弈
驾驶员行为
交通冲突
traffic engineering
intersection without traffic light
reduplicate game
vehicle-cross action
traffic conflict
