地方政府与炒房者间主从微分对策形成的两类Bang-Coast控制

Two Kinds of Bang-Coast Controls Caused by Stackelberg Differential Game between Local Government and Real Estate Speculators

通过构建地方政府与当地炒房者间一个主从微分对策的经济学模型,两类成因相异的Bang-Coast控制得到了研究:(1)两个局中人"同时"改变策略的Bang-Coast控制;(2)局中人之间的牵制作用形成的不满足奇异弧的Coast控制。并获得结论:地方政府的动态房产税税率应尽可能与炒房者行为同步,且采取连续渐变为宜;即使囤房行为被完全抑制,政府仍有必要维持一个抑制囤房再度兴起的动态临界税率;为避免房产税被转嫁,政府应以高税率开征。

By constructing a Stackelberg differential game model between local government and real estate speculators,two kinds of Bang-Coast controls which were derived by different causes were studied：（1） According to the Bang-Coast controls,two players would switch their dynamic strategies SIMULTANEOUSLY;（2） The Coast control unsatisfied singular arc condition was derived by restraining function between two players,and attained the conclusions： Local government＇s dynamic property tax rate should synchronized with speculators＇ actions as far as possible,and continuous gradation would be better.Even the housing-hoarding behaviors were inhibited,it＇s necessary for government to maintain a dynamic critical tax rate in order to suppress house-hoarding.In addition,for the purpose of avoiding property tax transferred,high rate should be adopted at the very beginning of property tax reformation.